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This paper presents a dynamic model, inspired by evolutionary game the-
ory, of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. It
shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters’ attitudes to prob-
lems caused by incompatibility. If individuals display aversion to incompat-
ibility, standardization never fails to happen eventually, but societies some-
times end up picking inferior standards. In this case, official action can be
useful to quickly achieve sensible standardization. On the other hand, when
individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, there is neither
path-dependency, nor a lock-in problem, and regulation seems a poor alter-
native to laissez-faire.
Keywords: standardization, aversion and tolerance to incompatibility, equi-
librium selection. (JEL C73, D62, L1).
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Introduction
On the threshold of the 21st century, the globalization of market economies
is gathering speed with international trade growing four times as fast as the
economy. In this new economic environment there is an increasing need for
standardization and conformity assessment systems to come to span previ-
ously separated jurisdictions. Internationally accepted standards are neces-
sary, first to facilitate product comparisons and reduce technical barriers to
trade,1 and second to allow for better quality management and consumer
protection. More than 500 organizations work with the International Or-
ganization for Standardization, ISO, on the setting of standards.2 Domestic
organizations often duplicate this international activity. For instance, in the
US, there are more than 700 organizations trying to promote their own,
sometimes contradictory, specifications for adoption as standards. The pro-
liferation of these organizations illustrates the importance of the standard-
ization issue and helps to explain the difficulty of managing it successfully.
In a world where technologies are constantly evolving and information about
preferences is widely dispersed, setting standards is a tricky business. The
consensus in the US and ISO is to rely on de facto market forces. Many
in the EU, because of a political commitment to unification, favor a more
centralized approach to standard setting.
This paper analyses the process of standardization in decentralized econ-
omies. It highlights the conditions under which centralized intervention is
desirable and those where, on the contrary, laissez-faire seems preferable. The
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analysis is conducted in the spirit of evolutionary game theory to take account
of the dynamic nature of standard adoption. Showing how adopters’ attitudes
toward incompatibility affect the outcome of a decentralized standardization
process is the main contribution of the paper.
Aversion to incompatibility occurs if coordination failures are costly to
users. This is the case with traffic regulations and signs, electrical norms,
and drug formulas. People display little tolerance to incompatibility when
their safety is at stake. If adopters fear standardization failures, they will
attempt to avoid them. In the presence of aversion to incompatibility, we
show that the decentralized adoption process inevitably leads to a single
standard being established. Still, it is not always possible to predict which
standard will end up being selected. If the alternatives are not very differ-
ent, adopters sometimes coordinate on an inferior one. Since laissez-faire can
lead to inefficient outcomes, an official intervention helps to quickly achieve
sensible standardization. In every country in the world there are traffic rules,
electrical norms, and other mandatory standards intended to protect users’
health and safety. The European Committee for Standardization, US Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission, and Food and Drug Administration are
examples of agencies whose role is to promote such performance standards.
Neutrality to incompatibility holds when there are direct coordination ex-
ternalities. This covers one-to-one communication equipment such as tele-
phone, facsimile, and computer networks. These goods provide direct links
between users. Since making a connection requires that the parties use
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compatible technologies, achieving standardization is important. More sub-
scribers using a particular standard increases the chance of being able to
communicate for all those using that standard. Under neutrality to incom-
patibility, we show that a decentralized standards adoption process always
leads to selection of the best one. Common standards among the world’s tele-
phone, facsimile and computer Networks should come as no surprise. This
standardization outcome maximizes social welfare.
Tolerance to incompatibility occurs if there are indirect coordination ex-
ternalities. Examples include items like personal computers, music players,
and VCRs. Here, consumers care about compatibility because the availabil-
ity of complementary goods depends on sales of the primary good. As the
quantity of available videos, compact disks, tapes or software increases, con-
sumers tend to lose interest in the number of other users. Individuals then
pick the technology that happens to suit them best. It should not be surpris-
ing that a decentralized adoption process occasionally results in a multiple
standard equilibrium. In the presence of tolerance to incompatibility, we
show that adoption of a single standard is no longer systematic, nor even
necessarily optimal. Users take their time and experiment. Only the domi-
nant technology can emerge from the standardization process as the unique
choice.
From an empirical point of view, the results are consistent with the ev-
idence on diffusion curves of new technologies, which are known to be S-
shaped. The diffusion curves obtained from our theoretical analysis are also
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S-shaped. This is true regardless of individuals’ attitudes towards incompat-
ibility. Whether there is aversion, neutrality or tolerance makes no difference
here. Moreover, our paper gives particular insights into the comparative
benefits of decentralization and regulation in the setting of standards. When
there is a public safety issue at stake, this calls for regulation or mandatory
standardization. In the presence of aversion to incompatibility, official inter-
vention is necessary to hasten coordination while preventing moves toward
inferior standards. On the other hand, in the presence of tolerance or neu-
trality with respect to incompatibility, there is no risk of either ‘lock- in’ or
safety hazards. This is in contrast to the risk that regulators or ’experts’
might misrepresent consumers’ tastes and needs. Regulation, at least in the
early stages of the adoption process, seems a poor alternative to experimen-
tation by users.
Relationship with the literature
The classic economic literature relies on non-cooperative game theory to ad-
dress the standardization issue.3 This literature provides a comprehensive
study of producers’ behavior in the presence of network externalities, leaving
the demand side of standard adoption a black box. Consumers are assumed to
simultaneously adopt one of the available standards. Positive coordination
externalities then generate multiple equilibria. In most cases, the authors
characterize equilibria analytically, but fail to solve what Arthur (1988) calls
the selection problem. In pioneering papers, Arthur (1988,1989) proposes to
address this issue by using stochastic models. His idea is that coordination
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externalities tend to magnify ’historical events’ - the path- dependency prop-
erty, and trap the dynamics in a possibly dominated standard - the lock-in
property. Arthur’s seminal contribution highlights the fact that, standardiza-
tion generally being the result of a sequence of decentralized choices, history
matters. However, he also suggests, through the examples he develops, that
the alternative to regulation is a highly unpredictable, path-dependent decen-
tralized process. This contradicts the intuitive perception that market-driven
standardization is not all that unpredictable or inefficient. There remains the
question of how independent, heterogeneous individuals actually coordinate
their choices, that is to say, how a particular equilibrium comes to prevail.
This question lies at the core of the growing literature on evolutionary
game theory and social learning, the aim of which is to study equilibrium se-
lection in games that have multiple equilibria. This literature explains how
equilibrium can emerge as a result of learning or adaptation, rather than
from rational introspection.4 Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), in a by-now
classic paper, have shown that symmetrical games (involving large numbers
of myopic players and noisy mutations) naturally lead players, who hesitate
between two Nash equilibria, to select the risk-dominant one. This contribu-
tion has been a major step in the area of equilibrium selection. Their result
holds independently of any initial conditions or ’historical events’. More im-
portantly, from our point of view, it has opened the door to a predictive
theory of coordination problems in dynamic settings.
In the spirit of this original and fruitful line of research, this paper focuses
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on the coordination problem faced by heterogeneous individuals who have to
choose between two standards. There are two time scales: a short one for
individuals and a longer one for societies as a whole. The dynamic dimension
is captured by the fact that individuals adopt one or the other standard
sequentially and in a random order. The two time scales –individual and
social– are captured by the fact that ‘new-born’ adopters who inherit a state
of standardization from their predecessors are not forward-looking. Their
limited life span requires them to optimize in the short run. One may wonder
whether successive myopic adoptions will lead to some kind of unconscious
collective maximizing behavior, or, on the contrary, to pure path-dependency.
The answer depends on the particular standard at stake.
We show that in the long run the stochastic decentralized process of adop-
tion behaves like a deterministic dynamic one. Since in its static version the
coordination problem admits multiple equilibria, introducing the dynamics
solves the selection issue. Only stable equilibria of the associated determin-
istic process can emerge in the long run. An important aspect of our paper
is then to highlight the role concavity or convexity of the individuals’ utility
function plays in equilibrium selection. Contrary to the Kandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993) setting, and to all other settings of which we are aware,
agents’ utilities are not necessarily linear with respect to the fraction of the
population which chooses the same standard. We show that convexity cor-
responds to an aversion to incompatibility, and concavity to a tolerance for
it. Linearity corresponds to neutrality. When individuals are averse to in-
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compatibility, standardization eventually occurs. The standard that ends up
being selected is not always predictable, though. The fact that the equilib-
rium is not necessarily unique implies that the decentralized process some-
times selects the inferior standard. These are the path-dependent and lock-in
properties described by Arthur (1988). On the other hand, when individuals
display tolerance for incompatibility, standardization is no longer systematic.
The adoption process, however, is always predictable. Finally, when individ-
uals are neutral toward incompatibility, the decentralized process leads to
standardization on the dominant standard. From the standpoint of society,
this is an optimal outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3 presents some general results about the convergence of the stochastic
process. Section 4 derives the equilibria and diffusion curves. Section 5 char-
acterizes the optimal solution and contrasts this solution with the equilibria
of section 4. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
I The Model
We take a discrete choice model with two incompatible standards from which
to choose, A and B. Adopters have an inelastic demand for one unit of the
’good’. Their preferences are parameterized by δ ∈ [0, 1], which we call a
’type’. The δ term can be interpreted as determining the adaptation cost
incurred by agents when they have to accept a for them imperfect standard,
rather than enjoying their ideal one which would have been located at δ.
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That is, δ is the ’distance’ between the individual and standard A, located
at point 0, 1 − δ being the distance between the individual and standard
B, located at 1. Moreover, adopters’ preferences for A or B depend on the
market share enjoyed by each standard, denoted xA and xB respectively. The
preferences of a type-δ agent over standard k(= A, B) are represented by
the utility functions k → (1− δk)uk(xk), where δA = δ and δB = 1− δ. The
functions uA and uB are defined net of the price of purchasing the standard.
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It follows that a type δ agent prefers one combination of standard and market
share to another if and only if it renders a higher utility to that agent:
(A, xA) δ (B, xB) ⇔ (1− δ)uA(xA) ≥ δuB(xB).(1)
Functions uA and uB, which are the same for all agents, but are not neces-
sarily equal to each other, satisfy the following assumption:
A1 uk(0) = 0 and u
′
k(x) > 0 ∀x ≥ 0 (k = A,B).
According to assumption A1, the higher the proportion of the population
using a given standard, the greater the net benefit to each individual adopting
it. In other words, there are positive network externalities. This assumption
is consistent with the literature on learning and evolution in games. In all
the papers, as in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), the benefit that an agent
derives from adopting a technology increases in the fraction of the rest of the
population that also adopt it. However, in these papers, as well as in the
network externalities literature, the payoffs are affine functions of market
share. In the learning literature, where the payoff matrix is independent of
players’ strategies (i.e., they affect the payoff probability but not the payoff
9
itself), this assumption is natural. It is less convincing in a coordination game
such as standard adoption, in which individual benefits depend directly on
the fraction of the population that make compatible choices. We consider
any function uk that satisfies A1, including both concave and convex ones.
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Let δtL be the marginal consumer at time t; i.e., the one who has no
particular preference for either standard. By equation (1), δtL is the solution
to (1− δ)uA(xtA) = δuB(xtB), that is:
δtL =
uA(x
t
A)
uA(xtA) + uB(x
t
B)
.(2)
We deduce that an agent δ, entering the market at date t + 1, chooses
standard A if δ ≤ δtL, and standard B otherwise. This type of behavior is
referred to as myopic, because the agent does not try to incorporate in his
decision the way the standard will evolve in the future. In practice when
consumers face a new adoption choice they heavily discount the future, in
great part because they anticipate the phenomenon of obsolescence. In this
paper, we take the extreme view that the adopters’ psychological discount
factor is infinite. This implies that, conditional on the past, their adoption
choice is deterministic.7 On the contrary, the law governing their entry (the
sequence of adopters) is exogenous and random. ‘Nature’ decides who will
come next. Candidates for adoption are distributed over the interval [0, 1]
according to a bounded density function f(.) whose cumulative distribution
function is denoted F (.).
A2 δ is distributed over [0, 1] according to a bounded density f(.).
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Hence, the probability that an individual entering at round t + 1 will
adopt standard k is simply PA(x
t
A, x
t
B) = Prob(δ ≤ δtL) for standard A, and
PB(x
t
A, x
t
B) = Prob(δ > δ
t
L) = 1 − PA(xtA, xtB) for standard B. We deduce
from assumption A2 and equation (2) that
PA(x
t
A, x
t
B) = F
( uA(xtA)
uA(xtA) + uB(x
t
B)
)
.(3)
It is easy to check that, under assumption A1, the probability P tk = Pk(x
t
A, x
t
B)
increases in the market share of standard k (and thus decreases in the market
share of the other standard). This is only natural, since individual decisions
are shaped by positive coordination externalities. Let us now examine how
successive adoption choices eventually aggregate into a collective choice.
II Emergence of Macro-Structure: a (Path-
Dependent) Strong Law Theorem
The dynamics of the model are as follows. Time is discrete and its horizon
infinite. Period t = 1, 2, ... designates the tth round of adoption. The rate at
which adopters arrive on the market is not important (except when looking
at convergence time); the relevant time is not that of the clock, but rather
that of events. At each adoption round, an agent identified by δ is ran-
domly drawn from the population of adopters according to the probability
density f . The sequence of adopters is exogenous and random. The adop-
tion choice, though, is endogenous and deterministic. The agents make their
choice among standards depending on their current market shares and their
own particular preference. For a given individual δ at a given date t+ 1, she
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will adopt A if δ ≤ δtL and B otherwise.
Let N0k ≥ 1 be the initial number of adopters of standard k(= A,B).
From a technical point of view, this can be any integer larger than one. For
the purpose of the analysis, though, it seems natural to focus on two cases:
N0A and N
0
B both small, as would be the case in the introduction of two
variants of a new technology; and N0A small with N
0
B large (or vice versa), as
when a new standard begins to challenge a long-established one. Moreover,
let N tk denote the cumulative number of agents that have adopted standard
k at time t, and N t denote the cumulative number of adoptions which have
occurred up to time t. Observe that N t = N0A +N
0
B + t.
The market share of standard k at time t is xtk = N
t
k/N
t. Since from equation
(3) P tk denotes the probability that standard k will be selected at round t+1 of
adoption, the dynamics of market share are given by the following equation:
xt+1k =
1
N t + 1

N tk + 1 with probability P
t
k
N tk with probability 1− P tk.
(4)
Let αt =
1
N t + 1
. Then system (4) can be rewritten in the form:
xt+1k =

(1− αt)xtk + αt with probability P tk
(1− αt)xtk with probability 1− P tk.
(5)
We derive from system (5) the expected motion of market share with
respect to the current state xtk. We get:
E(xt+1k | xtk) = xtk + αt(P tk − xtk).(6)
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The interpretation of equation (6) is straightforward. The market share
of standard k increases in expectation if the probability of standard k being
adopted is greater than its current market share. Otherwise, it declines; term
αt(P tk − xtk) is positive when P tk > xtk and negative when P tk < xtk. Indeed,
if the market share of one standard is much smaller than its probability
of being adopted, then this standard will be chosen on average more than
proportionally to its current market share, and thus its market share will
grow. By the same reasoning, if the market share of one standard is much
larger than its probability of being adopted, then this standard’s market
share will decline. Intuition suggests that the system reaches an equilibrium
when adoption probability and market share equalize. This conjecture proves
to be correct.
Let ∆1 = {(x, y);x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0 and x + y = 1} denote the unit simplex.
The probability function P = (PA, PB) derived from equation (3), maps the
unit simplex of market shares into the unit simplex of probabilities. With the
stochastic process (5), we associate the deterministic system defined on ∆1
(unit simplex of market share), given by the following ordinary differential
equation (ODE) with dots for time derivatives:
x˙k = Pk(xA, xB)− xk k = A,B.(7)
Theorem 1 establishes that the vector of market shares xt = (xtA, x
t
B) of sys-
tem (5) converges towards the equilibria of the ordinary differential equation
(7).
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Theorem 1 (Hill-Lane-Sudderth (1980))
(i) Suppose P : ∆1 → ∆1, the probability function which maps the unit
simplex of market shares into the unit simplex of probabilities, is continuous.
Then the vector of market shares xt = (xtA, x
t
B) converges with probability
one to an equilibrium (x∗A, x
∗
B) of the ODE (7).
(ii) Suppose P maps the interior of the unit simplex into itself, and that
(x∗A, x
∗
B) is a stable equilibrium (as defined in the conventional way) of the
ODE (7). Suppose also that the initial market share (x0A, x
0
B) belongs to the
interior of the simplex. Then the process (xtA, x
t
B) has a positive probability
of converging to (x∗A, x
∗
B).
(iii) Suppose (x∗A, x
∗
B) is an unstable equilibrium of the ODE (7). Then the
process cannot converge to (x∗A, x
∗
B) with positive probability.
Instead of studying the convergence of the stochastic process (5), it is
sufficient, by virtue of Theorem 1, to study the convergence of the associ-
ated deterministic system (7). To understand this point, assume that, at the
beginning of the competitive process, the initial cumulative number of sub-
scribers, N0, is small (the case of two new standards competing to become
the market standard). Market share movement is then dominated by sharp
fluctuations. When the cumulative number of subscribers is small, each new
adoption makes market share jump. However, the impact of each new adop-
tion on market share movement decreases with the number of adoptions: the
first adopter has a dramatic impact, whereas the millionth one is negligible.
This creates a dynamic dampening of randomness over time.8 Trapped by
14
mass inertia, the stochastic process ends up being directed by the equiva-
lent deterministic system (7). Figure 5a illustrates these fluctuations and
their dampening.9 It is worth noting that, in the case of quadratic utility
functions, uA(x) = ax
2 and uB(y) = by
2, and uniform distribution, equa-
tion (7) gives the replicator dynamics for a homogeneous population playing
a symmetrical 2 × 2 coordination game (i.e., with payoff: Π(A,A) = a,
Π(B,B) = b, Π(A,B) = Π(B,A) = 0). That is, equation (7) becomes:
x˙ = x(ax− (ax2 + b(1− x)2)). This paper thus offers new micro-foundation
for the study of continuous-time replicator dynamics, which can be gener-
ated as the limit of a stochastic model with heterogeneous adopters in discrete
time.10
As in classic game theory, fixed points are candidates for equilibrium.
However, not all fixed points can be selected as equilibria: only stable ones
are eligible. An equilibrium x∗k of the ODE is locally stable if P
′
k−1 ≤ 0 at x∗k
(it is locally unstable otherwise). According to equation (6), if the probability
of a standard being adopted in the neighborhood of an equilibrium is larger
than its market share, this standard will be adopted increasingly and will
diverge from the equilibrium. Symmetrically, if the probability is smaller
than its market share, it will tend to converge to the equilibrium. This
implies that, xtk will diverge from a locally unstable equilibrium, and it will
tend to converge to a locally stable equilibrium.11 If the deterministic system
has a single stable fixed point, equilibrium is predictable. Whatever the
initial conditions N0A and N
0
B, the system will converge to this fixed point.
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On the other hand, if the deterministic system has multiple stable fixed
points, the outcome is unpredictable due to fluctuations at the outset. In
this case, equilibrium will be path-dependent. However, depending on the
initial conditions, it is possible to be more precise about the results. Let
x∗ = (x∗A, x
∗
B) be a stable equilibrium of (7). We define the basin of attraction
of x∗, denoted B(x∗), as the set of points x whose forward trajectory for
the ODE is attracted by x∗. That is, B(x∗) = {x ∈ ∆1 | lim
t→∞x(t) = x
∗},
where function x(t) denotes the solution of equation (7) with initial condition
x(0) = x (x is the vector of initial market shares). The following theorem
follows from Benaim (1998).
Theorem 2 Let x∗ ∈ ∆1 be a stable equilibrium of the ODE (7). Let Q ⊂
B(x∗) be a compact subset of the basin of attraction of x∗. There exists a
positive number k, uniquely dependent on Q, such that: If, at time τ ≥ 0,
the total number of adoptions is N τ = N τA+N
τ
B, and the market share vector
(xτA, x
τ
B) belongs to Q, then
Prob
(
lim
t→∞x
t = x∗
)
≥
(
1− 2
kN τ
)
e−
k
Nτ .
Theorem 2 gives a quantitative explanation of the ‘mass inertia’ principle
described previously. If, at the τth round of adoption, the market share is
close to a stable equilibrium x∗, nothing rules out the stochastic process of
adoption jumping to another basin of attraction.12 However, the larger N τ ,
the cumulative number of subscribers at time τ , the smaller the probability
of such a jump.
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III Equilibria
To identify the standard(s) that may emerge as the long-run outcome of the
stochastic process of adjustment, by virtue of Theorem 1 we need only study
the fixed points of P . Our candidates for equilibrium are the solutions of:
PA(x, 1− x) = x (or, equivalently, PB(x, 1− x) = 1− x). From equation (3)
we derive:
x = F
( uA(x)
uA(x) + uB(1− x)
)
.(8)
The candidates for long-run equilibrium are the pure strategy equilibria
of a static coordination game. In a game where everybody adopts simultane-
ously, an outcome is said to be an equilibrium if no individual “would wish to
defect to a different specification of the good from the one he is meant to be
getting, on the (equilibrium) assumption that he would be the only defector”
Farrell-Saloner (1986). It is easy to check that the pure-strategy equilib-
ria of the static game constitute solutions to equation (8). In particular,
PA(1, 0) = 1 (standardization on A), and PA(0, 1) = 0 (standardization on
B), are always equilibria. Moreover, depending on functions uA, uB, and F ,
incompatibility solutions also exist. For the purpose of analyzing these, we
assume, in what follows, that the agents are uniformly distributed over [0, 1].
A2’ δ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1].
This implies that each type of agent is equally likely to enter the market.
Under assumption A2’, equation (8) simply becomes: (1−x)uA(x) = xuB(1−
x). This allows us to concentrate on the impact of individuals’ preferences,
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represented by uA and uB, on standardization. In the spirit of the literature
on uncertainty, we introduce the definitions of tolerance and aversion to
incompatibility.
Definition 1 After selecting either standard A or B, consider the choice
between being matched with a population where either (i) with probability
µ everybody uses standard A and with probability (1 − µ) everybody uses
standard B; or (ii) µ percent of the population use standard A and (1 − µ)
percent use standard B. An attitude towards standardization is said to be
‘incompatibility-averse’ if it leads to a strict preference for (i). It is said to
be ‘incompatibility-tolerant’ if it leads to a strict preference for (ii). It is said
to be ‘incompatibility-neutral’ otherwise.
The way coordination externalities shape preferences depends on how
and why individuals coordinate. For instance, if, after choosing a vehicle
with a left- or right-hand drive, the choice is to be sent to a city where
either: (i) with probability 1/2 everybody drives on the left-hand side of the
road and with probability 1/2 everybody drives on the right-hand side of
the road, or (ii) half the people drive on the left-hand side and the other
half on the right-hand side, everybody would choose (i). On the other hand,
when a similar choice involves desktop computer technology with Macintosh
versus an IBM-compatible format, a majority of people choose (ii). Clearly,
individuals’ attitudes towards incompatibility depend on the nature of the
standard at stake.
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Where coordination failures are very costly to users, their attitude to-
wards standardization will be incompatibility averse. This occurs if imperfect
standardization puts them at risk, as is the case with air, sea or road traffic
regulations and signs, fire or electrical norms, and drug or chemical formu-
las. The great Baltimore fire of 1842 provides a good illustration of this.
As Krislov (1997) recalls ”Fire departments from the general area rushed to
help and had to stand helplessly by since the couplings for their water hoses
were incompatible with local designs.” Typically, this is a case where stan-
dardization, even on an inferior hose design, would have been better than
incompatibility. The loss of the Titanic in 1912 gives another example. The
liner Californian was only a few miles away and hundreds of lives could have
been saved had it picked up the Titanic’s SOS call. At the first Interna-
tional Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in London 1914, it was
decided that large vessels should maintain 24-hour radio watch. This rule
has remained in force ever since. By contrast, individuals’ attitudes towards
incompatibility will be tolerant when coordination failures cost them little.
This occurs if benefits associated with a new adoption stagnate with a high
number of adoptions. Examples include the video recorder, CD player, or per-
sonal computer. When the number of complementary goods (i.e., software,
CDs, or videos) is large, users do not benefit from further new adoptions.
From their point of view, the gains of coordination being indirect, there are
decreasing returns to scale in adoption. Finally, individuals’ attitudes to-
wards incompatibility will be neutral when the marginal benefit associated
with a new adoption, for a fixed population, is constant. This is the case
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with telephone, facsimile or computer networks because for one-to-one com-
munication each subscriber is equally important. For equipment providing a
direct communication service, there are constant returns to scale in adoption
which characterizes neutrality.
The different attitudes towards incompatibility shape the individuals’
utility functions. Tolerance to incompatibility leads, by virtue of definition
1, to the strict choice of (ii). This is equivalent to µkuk(1) + (1−µk)uk(0) <
uk(µk) ∀µk ∈ (0, 1). A sufficient condition for this inequality to be true
for all µk ∈ (0, 1) is the strict concavity of uk. In other words, concavity
of uk indicates tolerance to incompatibility. Similarly, convexity of uk indi-
cates aversion to incompatibility. Indeed, the strict convexity of uk implies
µkuk(1)+(1−µk)uk(0) > uk(µk) ∀µk ∈ (0, 1), which leads to the strict choice
of (i). Finally, neutrality to incompatibility, which leads to indifference, is
equivalent to linearity: µkuk(1) + (1 − µk)uk(0) = uk(µk) ∀µk ∈ (0, 1). In
what follows, we distinguish two cases: both uA(.) and uB(.) are convex or
linear; both uA(.) and uB(.) are strictly concave. As will be shown, this
difference matters.
A Aversion and neutrality to incompatibility
First of all consider the case where the utility functions are linear, that
is uA(x) = ax, uB(x) = bx, and are equal to each other, a = b. This
implies in equation (3) PA(x, 1 − x) = x ∀x ∈ [0, 1]: Any market share
allocation x ∈ [0, 1] is a stable equilibrium of the ODE (7) and, by virtue of
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Theorem 1, a potential candidate for market equilibrium. When individuals
display neutrality to incompatibility and the standards are perfect substitute,
the problem is degenerated. In what follows, we rule out this case on the
ground that it is non-generic. In practice there are always differences between
standards. Yet if a and b are very close, but are not exactly equal to each
other, the equilibrium is uniquely determined.13 In the linear case, we pose:
A3 a 6= b
When utility functions are convex, or linear, with respect to market share, the
marginal benefit associated with new adoptions increases with the number
of adopters. The benefits individuals derive from standardization are large.
It is intuitive that they would exceed the gains from diversity associated
with an incompatibility equilibrium and eventually drive the decentralized
adjustment process towards standardization.
Proposition 1 When utility functions are convex, or linear, standardization
occurs with probability one. Nevertheless, the selected standard is not always
predictable. It is
- either A or B if: u′A(0) ≤ uB(1) and u′B(0) ≤ uA(1) (AN1)
-A if: u′A(0) > uB(1) (AN2)
-B if: u′B(0) > uA(1) (AN3)
Proof: Appendix A.
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When individuals display aversion or neutrality to incompatibility, there
is a corner solution. The positive coordination
externalities are strong enough to push the decentralized adoption process
towards standardization. The standard selected depends on the conditions
illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
The interpretation of these conditions is as follows. Condition AN1 im-
plies that the utility associated with the adoption of standard A is, for iden-
tical market shares, similar to the utility associated with the adoption of
standard B. That is to say, uA(x) and uB(x) are not too different. When
neither standard is significantly better than the other, knowledge of adopters’
behavior and the characteristics of the standards are not sufficient to predict
equilibrium. Depending on initial conditions and the actual play of the first
rounds of adoption, either technology may end up as a de facto standard.
This situation corresponds to the case described by Arthur (1988, 1989).
Increasing or constant returns exacerbate ‘historical events’, so that, if, by
chance, one of the standards has gained an adoption advantage, it increases
its lead and eventually conquers the whole market. An extreme example
of path-dependency, which is ruled out by assumption A3, is provided by
the linear case; AN1 is equivalent to a = b.14 For a nice illustration of the
path-dependent and lock-in properties, see the explanation by David (1985)
of how the QWERTY typewriter keyboard arrangement ended up as the US
national standard.
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On the other hand, condition AN2 implies that, for identical market share,
the gross utility derived from the adoption of standard A is always higher
than that derived from the adoption of standard B (and vice-versa under
condition AN3).15 For instance, in the linear case, AN2 is equivalent to
a > b and AN3 to b > a. We then say that standard A has a pronounced
advantage over standard B (respectively standard B over standard A), in the
sense that it is sufficiently better to drive its competitor out of the market
independently of initial conditions (N0A, N
0
B). In the telecommunications in-
dustry, an example of such a pronounced advantage is given by the telephone
as compared to the telegraph.
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 describes the probability, under the convexity assumption, that
the next adopter will choose standard A as a function of the current market
share of xA (the probability of choosing B as a function of B’s market share is
the complement in the unit square). The candidates for equilibrium (i.e., the
fixed points of P ) are the intersection points of function PA and the bisectrix.
Convergence to equilibria (stable fixed points) are indicated by the arrows.
B Tolerance to incompatibility
When the utility functions are concave in market share, there are, from the
individuals’ point of view, decreasing returns to adoption. The marginal
benefit associated with a new adoption, for a fixed population, decreases
with the number of adopters. Coordination failure being less costly to users,
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it comes as no surprise that incompatibility solutions occur.
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Proposition 2 When the utility functions are strictly concave, market share
is always predictable. Standardization, however, is no longer systematic. The
market
- sustains incompatibility if: u′A(0) ≥ uB(1) and u′B(0) ≥ uA(1) (T1)
- standardizes on A if: u′B(0) < uA(1) (T2)
- standardizes on B if: u′A(0) < uB(1) (T3)
Proof: Appendix A.
Under tolerance to incompatibility, the decentralized process of adoption
is always predictable. That is, concavity cushions coordination externalities
and eliminates historical events, so that, given initial conditions N0A and N
0
B,
the outcome is known. Figure 3 illustrates that the actual outcome differs
as a function of the conditions.
[Figure 3]
The interpretation of these conditions is as follows. Conditions T2 and
T3 are equivalent to conditions AN2 and AN3. When either standard has a
pronounced advantage over its competitor, it eventually drives the latter out
of the market and becomes the unique standard (condition T2 corresponds
to a pronounced advantage of standard A over standard B, and conversely
for condition T3). In the recording industry, an example of such pronounced
advantage is given by the CD as compared to vinyl.
On the other hand, under condition T1, which is similar to condition
AN1, utility functions uA(x) and uB(x) are not too different. When neither
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standard is significantly better than the other, individuals prefer to not co-
ordinate on a single standard rather than give up their personal preferences.
Examples of such incompatibility solutions include the coexistence of Nin-
tendo and Sega video games, Macintosh and IBM-compatible PC technology,
and CD and cassette tape players. An indication of tolerance to incompati-
bility is that incompatible standards may exist side-by-side for long periods.
Figure 4 illustrates the three different cases. It describes the probability that
the next adopter will choose standard A as a function of A’s current market
share. Stable equilibria are indicated by the arrows.
[Figure 4]
C Diffusion curves
There is not much hard evidence on standardization. The major part of
the literature is micro-oriented and qualitative in nature. An exception is
found in the literature on diffusion curves for new technologies. When a new
technology is introduced, it may or may not succeed in achieving a stable
market share. However, when it does so, market share evolution across time
is known to follow an S-shaped curve (see, for instance, Davies (1979) or
Nasbeth and Ray (1974)). That is, the proportion of adoption across time
is an increasing function which is at first convex and subsequently concave.
In the telecommunication industry, the inflection point is often referred to
as the ‘critical mass’ point. Telex (see Cabral and Leite (1991) for Portugal)
and telephone diffusion curves (see Hayashi (1992) for Japan) have behaved
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in this way. Since observed diffusion curves are S-shaped independently of
the technology or commodity at stake, we need to compare the results of our
paper with this empirical fact. With this in mind, we consider the case in
which a new standard or innovation is good enough to win a stable share of
the market. We compute the diffusion curve (the evolution of market share
across time), in association with the deterministic system that drives the
dynamic process.
Proposition 3 Diffusion curves associated with the deterministic system (7)
are S-shaped independently of individuals’ attitudes to incompatibility.
Proof: Appendix B.
The problem with proposition 3 is that it is established for the associated
deterministic system defined by equation (7), which describes the dynamics
of the process in the long run (i.e., when the cumulated number of adopters is
large). A priori it says nothing about the diffusion curves of the true stochas-
tic process that characterizes the dynamics of adoption of a new standard.
The relevance of proposition 3 depends on how quickly the shape of the
stochastic process defined by (5) comes to resemble the deterministic process
(7).
Given an initial market share x0, let {x(t)}t≥0 denote the deterministic
solution to (7) with initial condition x(0) = x0 and let {xt}t=0,1,... denote
the stochastic sequence of market shares given by (5) with the same initial
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condition. For each integer t ≥ 1 define the new time scale
τt = 1 +
1
2
+ . . .+
1
t
.
The next theorem, which follows from Benaim (1998) section 4.2, establishes
that the higher the N0, the initial number of adopters of the old standard,
the higher the probability that the diffusion curves will be S-shaped.
Theorem 3 There exist positive constants c1 and c2 (depending only on uA
and uB) such that: For each α ≥ 0 and every T > 0
Prob( sup
t: 0≤τt≤T
||xt − x(τt)|| ≥ α) ≤ exp(−N0 α
2
2c1T
+ c2T )
In other words, Theorem 3 establishes that the stochastic process remains
close to the deterministic path x(τt) with high probability over finite but
arbitrarily large time intervals, provided the initial number of adopters N0 is
large enough. Therefore, the larger the N0, the greater is the probability of
being able to observe an S-shaped diffusion curve for the stochastic adoption
process. Such behavior is observed in several numerical simulations depicted
in Figure 5 (a,b,c,d). By convention the ’old’ standard is B, the new one is A.
The depicted market share is xA. The time scale is ln(t).
16 The aggregated
collective behavior generated by theoretical analysis is consistent with the
empirical evidences on diffusion curves.
[Figure 5]
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IV Welfare Analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, there is growing concern worldwide over
standardization issues. Two lines of conduct emerge: the ‘regulated way’,
which tends to favor a centralized approach to the setting of standards, and
the ‘decentralized way’ which tends to rely on market forces. Since non-
harmonized standards are technical barriers to trade, the EU favors the cen-
tralized way. Standardization in the EU is mandatory by law.17 This is in
contrast with the US which favors a decentralized approach that relies on
‘voluntary’ standardization. The question we address next is whether there
is a need for centralized intervention at all.
We compute the socially optimal market share allocation and contrast
this with the decentralized equilibrium. Assuming each individual is given
the same weight, the long-run optimal market share allocation maximizes
consumers’ average utility. For given market shares x = (xA, xB), this aver-
age utility is:
W (xA, xB) =
∫ δL
0
(1−δ)uA(xA)dδ +
∫ 1
δL
δuB(xB)dδ.
Integrating this expression, the long-run optimal market share allocation is
the solution of:
Max
x
W (xA, xB) =
uA(xA) + uB(xB)
2
− uA(xA)uB(xB)
2[uA(xA) + uB(xB)]
.(9)
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A Aversion and neutrality to incompatibility
It is easy to check that utility function convexity implies the strict convex-
ity of W (xA, xB) = W (xA, 1 − xA) in xA. When individuals display either
aversion or neutrality to incompatibility, the optimum is a corner solution:
x∗A = 1 or x
∗
A = 0.
Proposition 4 When utility functions are convex or possibly linear, it is
always optimal to standardize. If uA(1) > uB(1), it is optimal to standardize
on A, and, otherwise, on B.18
This result is intuitive. Where individuals display either aversion or neu-
trality to incompatibility, the social gains derived from standardization on
the dominant standard are very strong. Such gains overwhelm the potential
diversity benefit associated with an incompatibility solution. We compare
the decentralized outcome with the socially optimal solution.
Corollary 1 Under neutrality to incompatibility, the decentralized standard-
ization process always leads to an efficient outcome. By contrast, under aver-
sion to incompatibility, the decentralized outcome is not necessarily an opti-
mum. It is optimal when condition AN2 or AN3 holds, but may be inefficient
otherwise.
This result is straightforward. Under neutrality to incompatibility individu-
als always manage to standardize on the dominant technology. By virtue of
proposition 4, this is optimal. Under aversion to incompatibility, individuals
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always manage to standardize. So, when one standard performs clearly bet-
ter than another one, they are able to coordinate on the superior standard.
However, when the standards are not sufficiently different, as under AN1,
they sometimes pick the inferior one. Once this happens, it is very difficult
to back-pedal or switch to the superior variant. Indeed, by virtue of Theo-
rem 2, the probability of switching, from a standard with ‘installed base’ N
to a standard without installed base, is proportional to 1
N
. The higher N ,
the lower the probability of a switch. This is illustrated by the history of
the US keyboard format. All attempts made to switch from the QWERTY
format to the alleged superior DVORAK one have failed (see David (1985),
and discussion by Liebowitz-Margolis (1994)).
B Tolerance to incompatibility
When the utility functions are strictly concave, the results are more ambigu-
ous. No matter how great the degree of individuals’ tolerance to incompati-
bility (no matter how great the concavity of their utility functions), aggregate
welfare itself cannot be concave. The presence of positive coordination ex-
ternalities tends to convexify the problem and push the solution into the
corners. So, under the following condition, which requires that the function
uA and uB are weakly concave, the maximization problem is convex. There
is a corner solution.19
T4 −u′′AuA − u′′BuB ≤
(
u′APB + u
′
BPA
)2
.
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Similarly when one standard is totally dominated by the other (i.e., is ob-
solete), there is also a corner solution. Actual obsolescence is defined in the
following terms.20
T2+ u′A(1) > u
′
B(0) T3+ u
′
B(1) > u
′
A(0)
However, as stated in the following proposition, the optimal trade- off
between diversity and compatibility does not always lead to standardization
on the dominant standard.
Proposition 5 In the concave case when either condition T2+, T3+ or T4
is satisfied, standardization on the dominant standard, argmax{uA(1), uB(1)},
is optimal. An incompatibility solution might dominate standardization oth-
erwise.
Proof: Appendix C.
Concavity cushions coordination externalities so that an incompatibility
solution is sometimes preferable to full blown standardization. This occurs
when the benefits of adoption run out with a large number of adopters.21
Standardization deprives consumers of valuable diversity without providing
corresponding compatibility benefits. We next compare the optimal solution
with the decentralized outcome.
Corollary 2 Under tolerance to incompatibility, the decentralized outcome
is optimal when one standard is obsolete with respect to the other, or when
one standard has a pronounced advantage over the other, and, simultane-
32
ously, utility functions are weakly concave. The outcome may not be efficient
otherwise.
Proof: Appendix D.
When standards are not significantly different (i.e., under condition T1),
the market sustains an incompatibility equilibrium, but it is easy to find cases
where it would be better to standardize. Similarly, when one standard has a
pronounced advantage over the other (i.e., under T2 or T3, but not T2+ or
T3+), the market always standardizes, even if, in some cases, an incompati-
bility solution would be better for society as a whole. An insufficient degree
of standardization or excessive degree of standardization illustrates the same
problem. In the presence of tolerance to incompatibility, the decentralized
adoption process tends to overlook small groups of users and to favor large
ones in their respective need for diversity.
C Regulation Vs. Laissez-Faire
The inefficiencies involved in laissez-faire are not surprising: we are dealing
with externalities. The question these inefficiencies raise, however, is whether
regulation should be preferred to the decentralized process. This is a delicate
question because for planners to take the optimal decision requires not only
that they have a comprehensive knowledge of individuals’ preference but also
that they be benevolent. Especially in decentralized economies, information
is widely dispersed. Users are the only ones to know their own preferences
and needs. Moreover, people are generally self-interested and opportunistic.
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Institutions’ attempts to assert their own authority in standardization issues
in the US illustrates this opportunism problem. Most emanate from industry
representatives who try to stall competition through the ‘official standards’
they promote. The proliferation of these organizations, which have been
called a ‘maze’, creates a crowding- out effect. It is then left to the market
to achieve standardization.
In the case of neutrality and tolerance to incompatibility, this might be
a good thing, because users take time to experiment. For instance, per-
sonal computer technology was introduced in 1977 and is still not completely
standardized twenty years later. The risk of ‘lock-in’ is irrelevant. In fact,
people have been able to make the switch from traditional typewriter to
computer, from vinyl record player to compact disk player, and from tele-
graph to telephone. This is in contrast with the risk of regulators or experts
misrepresenting consumer tastes and needs. For instance, Rosenberg (1993)
recalls that “Western Union was given the opportunity to purchase Bell’s
telephone patent in 1877 for $100,000, but turned it down”. Similarly “Mar-
coni’s invention of the ’wireless’ was originally perceived as a technology for
ship-to-shore communication.” These examples concerning telephones and
radio illustrate the fact that contemporaries were unable to foresee the fu-
ture use to which these innovations would be put. Since it is difficult to
forecast which innovations will be successful and which will not, the issue of
experimentation by users is very important. The experience of the European
Committee for Standardization (ECS) confirms that early attempts to stan-
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dardize new technologies are counterproductive. Standards that took several
months to emerge were generally obsolete before their publication. The ECS
has thus changed its strategy. It is now favoring a ‘performance’ approach to
standardization; it promotes minimal standards for quality and safety rather
than complete commodity design.
Whenever safety issues are at stake, thoughtful and concerted action is
necessary to hasten the standardization process and orient it to the best alter-
native. For instance the first international standardization organization was
the International Electrotechnical Commission. Created in 1906, it gave rise
to the first coherent grids that turned electricity into a safer and more reli-
able source of energy. This was necessary to convince reluctant consumers to
adopt it. In our own day, the problem of illegal drugs illustrates our point. A
recent study from the National Center for Health Statistics revealed that 80%
of poisoning injury death in the US are drugs related. “Opiates and cocaine
were two of the leading causes of drug-related poisoning death” (May/June
98 issue of Public Health Report). Since these drugs are illegal, their composi-
tion fails to meet safety standard which explains many poisoning. Similarly,
in developing countries the proliferation of counterfeit drugs, which vary in
their composition from one dealer to the other, constitutes such a threat to
health that a vast majority of the inhabitants prefers to avoid them.22 For
instance, a survey in Zimbabwe suggests that 80% of the population rely on
traditional remedies because people are too poor to buy official medicines and
those available on the street are very unreliable. These problems arise be-
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cause ”many developing countries lack national standards that are compatible
with the international norms developed by such bodies as ISO. Moreover, the
national institutions responsible for developing standards and assessing con-
formity are often weak” (The World Bank 1998). Without a minimal level of
coercive standardization, in particular quality and safety performance stan-
dards, complex decentralized systems cannot operate. Standard setting is at
the core of nation-building and a keystone of economic integration.
V Conclusion
This paper offers an insight into how standards and norms emerge in decen-
tralized economies. In particular, it provides a way to link individuals’ atti-
tudes towards incompatibility with the collective outcome of the standard-
ization process. When individuals display aversion to incompatibility, stan-
dardization is systematic. Still, the actual standard which will be selected is
not always predictable. Dispersed individuals sometimes make mistakes and
pick the dominated standard. On the other hand, when individuals display
tolerance to incompatibility, the decentralized process of adoption is always
predictable, but it may sustain an incompatibility equilibrium and usually
fails to achieve the optimal trade-off between compatibility and diversity.
However, if standardization occurs, it is always on the best alternative. Fi-
nally, when individuals display neutrality to incompatibility, standardization
on the dominant standard is systematic. Consistent with the empirical evi-
dence, our analysis yields an aggregated collective behavior which generates
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S-shaped diffusion curves.
Contrary to what was suggested by Arthur’s (1988) seminal work, path-
dependency is not a central feature of standardization in decentralized econo-
mies. The decentralized process of adoption is predictable, except for stan-
dards that are subject to aversion to incompatibility and are not significantly
different from each other. Overall predictability in this context means that,
somehow, negligible and anonymous agents are able to coordinate. This is
consistent with evolutionary game theory results. Successive myopic adop-
tions give rise to some kind of unconscious collective maximizing behavior.
The emergence of this structure of collective behavior is very interesting be-
cause it is not driven by any single conscious will. It is a social phenomenon.
We conclude that centralized intervention is necessary when individuals dis-
play aversion to incompatibility. In this case, coordination failures are costly
to users, so that it is a priority to achieve rapid, well thought-out standardiza-
tion. On the other hand, in cases of tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility,
individuals take time to experiment, and never end up mistaking a bad stan-
dard for good one. Gambling on the choice of a standard, for the sake of
achieving early standardization, is unlikely to improve welfare. Where there
is no imperative coordination problem and in the absence of safety concerns,
it seems better to rely on decentralization.
As a further extension of this study, the effect on standardization of other
population probability distributions could be analyzed. It could also be ex-
tended to studying the case of competition between incompatible standards
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in the presence of a larger number of standards.
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APPENDIX A: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
a) Equilibrium candidates: Under assumption A1, both xA = 1 and
xA = 0 are solutions to equation (8). An interior solution also exists if and
only if it exists x ∈]0, 1[ such that H(x) = uA(x)
x
− uB(1−x)
1−x = 0. Since H(x)
is increasing when uA(x) and uB(y) are convex and is decreasing when they
are concave, this is equivalent to lim
x→0H(x) = u
′
A(0)−uB(1) and limx→1H(x) =
uA(1) − u′B(0) having opposite signs. In the linear case, H(x) = a − b, and
it exists an (infinity of) interior solution if and only if a = b, which is ruled
out by assumption A3. We easily deduce conditions AN1 and T1, which we
complete by conditions AN2 and AN3, and T2 and T3, respectively.
b) Stability: In this one-dimensional setting an equilibrium is locally stable
(respectively unstable) if the derivative of the functionG(x) = uA(x)
uA(x)+uB(1−x)−
x taken at the equilibrium point is negative (respectively positive). That
is, an equilibrium x∗A is locally stable (respectively unstable) if, at xA =
x∗A, P
′
A − 1 < 0 (respectively P ′A − 1 > 0). It is easy to check that the
equilibrium x∗A = 0 is stable under conditions AN1 and AN3 and under
condition T2, but unstable under condition AN2 and under conditions T1
and T3. Similarly it is easy to check that the equilibrium x∗A = 1 is stable
under conditions AN1 and AN2 and under condition T3, but unstable under
condition AN3 and under conditions T1 and T2. For the interior equilibrium
x∗A = x
l ∈]0, 1[ (x∗B = 1 − xl), which exists only under condition AN1 or
T1, we have G′(x)|x=xl = xl
(1−xl)u′A(xl)+xlu′B(1−xl)
uA(xl)
− 1. We get G′(x)|x=xl ≥ 0
under condition AN1, and G′(x)|x=xl ≤ 0 under condition T1. The interior
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equilibrium is unstable under condition AN1, and stable under condition T1.
These results are illustrated in figure 2 and 5 (when the probability function
has a positive slope at the equilibrium point, the equilibrium is unstable; it
is stable otherwise).
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APPENDIX B : Proposition 3 (diffusion curves)
Let standard A be an innovation so that in the convex case condition AN2
holds, and in the concave case either condition T1 or T2 holds. the whole
market, under condition T1, it Let x∗A denote the market share that standard
A wins at equilibrium (i.e., x∗A = 1 under AN2 and T2, x
∗
A ∈ (0, 1) under
T1). Let x(t) denote the diffusion curve –the market share evolution across
time– of standard A. ¿From basically zero at its introduction time, x(t) is
going to rise across time and eventually converge to x∗A > 0. Since under AN2
(respectively, T1 and T2), PA is always greater than x for all 0 < x ≤ x∗A (see
figures 3 and 5), we deduce from equation (7) that x′(t) = PA(x, 1−x)−x > 0.
The diffusion curve, x(t), is increasing. We study next its shape. It is given
by: x′′(t) = x′(t)(dPA(x,1−x)
dx
− 1). Since x′(t) > 0, the convexity/concavity
of the diffusion curve depends on the sign of dPA(x,1−x)
dx
− 1 ∀x ≤ x∗A. Under
AN2 (respectively T1 and T2), there exists an inflection point, tˆ, for x(t).
It is reached when dPA(x,1−x)
dx
= 1. Let xˆ = x(tˆ) be the image of tˆ. It is the
point where PA parallels the bisectrix, so that xˆ = x(tˆ) ∈ (0, x∗A). We deduce
that x′′(t) > 0 for t < tˆ, and x′′(t) < 0 for t > tˆ, showing that the function,
t→ x(t), is S-shaped. This is illustrated in figure 5 (the slope of PA(x, 1−x)
is greater than the bisectrix for x ≤ xˆ, and smaller for x ∈ (xˆ, x∗A)).
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APPENDIX C : Proof of Proposition 4
Under assumption T2+ (respectively T3+), the function uA(xA)+uB(1−xA)
2
is
increasing in xA (respectively decreasing). It is thus maximum for xA = 1
(respectively xA = 0). Since W (xA, 1 − xA) < uA(xA)+uB(1−xA)2 for all xA ∈
]0, 1[, and W (xA, 1 − xA) = uA(xA)+uB(1−xA)2 for xA = 0 or xA = 1, the
optimum is a corner solution: x∗A = 1 under T2+, and x
∗
A = 0 under T3+.
When uA and uB are concave, W (xA, 1 − xA) cannot be concave. Indeed
dW
dxA
|0= −u
′
B(1)
2
< 0 < dW
dxA
|1= u
′
A(1)
2
, where the concavity requires dW
dxA
to be
decreasing. It can however be convex. Let d
2W
dxA
2 = [
u′′AuA+u
′′
BuB
(uA+uB)
+
(u′AuB+u
′
BuA)
2
(uA+uB)3
]−
u′′Au
3
A+u
′′
Bu
3
B+uBuA(u
′′
AuA+u
′′
BuB)
2(uA+uB)3
. Assumption T4 and u′′k ≤ 0, imply that d
2W
dxA
2 ≥
0. The optimum is a corner solution: x∗A = 1 or x
∗
A = 0. When condition
T4 is not satisfied, the social welfare function can be neither convex nor
concave (the problem does not admit a general analytical solution). It is
then possible to find cases where standardization is no longer optimal. For
instance let uA(x) = uB(x) = Kx − x2, K > 2. It is easy to check that
W (1
2
, 1
2
) = 3
8
(K − 0.5) > W (0, 1) = W (1, 0) = 1
2
(K − 1) for K < 2.5. An
incompatibility solution dominates standardization when K ∈]2, 2.5[.
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APPENDIX D : Proof of Corollary 2
Since condition T2+ (respectively T3+) implies condition T2 (respectively
T3), when T2+ or T3+ is satisfied, the market outcome (standardization)
is efficient. Similarly, since under condition T4 it is optimal to standardize,
when T4 holds with either T2 or T3 the market outcome is also efficient.
However, when none of these conditions hold, the market outcome can be
inefficient.
For instance, let uA(x) = uB(x) = Kx − x2, K > 2. It is easy to check
that, under this specification, condition T1 is satisfied so that the market
is going to sustain the incompatibility equilibrium: x∗A =
1
2
, x∗B =
1
2
. But if
simultaneously K ≥ 2 +√2, condition T4 holds so that it would be socially
optimal to standardize (since the left side of the inequality in T4 is minimum
for xtk =
1
2
, a sufficient condition for T4 is u′(1
2
) = K−1 ≥ [2x(K−x)+2(1−
x)(K − 1 + x)]0.5 which is true as soon as K ≥ 2 +√2). More surprisingly
the market can standardize when it would be optimal to sustain diversity.
Let uA(x) = u(x) and uB(x) = βu(x) with u(x) =
∫ x
0 v(x˜)dx˜ and
v(x˜) =

1 if x˜ < 0.5− a
1−
2a
(0.5− a− x˜) + 1 if x˜ ∈ [0.5− a, 0.5 + a]
 if x˜ > 0.5 + a
with both a and  positive and close to 0. The slope of the function u(x)
is equal to 1 for x < 0.5 − a ≈ 0.5 and is equal to  ≈ 0 for x > 0.5 + a.
Since the utility function associated to standard k(= A,B) stagnates once
its market share has reached the threshold of xk =
1
2
, it would be optimal
from the welfare point of view to split the market between the two standards
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when  < β < u(1)
u′(0) ≈ 12 (or symmetrically when 1 > β > u
′(0)
u(1)
), but despite
this, standardization occurs.
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FOOTNOTES
(*) Previously titled Network Externalities and Market Structure: a Dy-
namic Approach, first version January 1994. We are indebted to Jacques
Cre´mer, Morris W. Hirsch, Jean- Jacques Laffont, Thomas Mariotti,
Lambros Pechlivanos, Re´gis Renault, as well as participants in the
ESEM 1994, the Networks and Competition conference, and the Fourgeaud
seminar for helpful comments. This paper has also greatly benefited
from two thorough referee reports and detailed and thoughtful com-
ments of the co-editor, Preston MacAfee. We are extremely grateful
for the resulting improvements. Any remaining errors are our own. Fi-
nally, we would like to thank David Liddell and John Edward Jaspers
for their editorial assistance.
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1. Numerous studies have documented large price differences between sep-
arated markets for the same good. Among the reasons for this persis-
tent segmentation between national markets is the existence of different
product standards (World Bank (1998)).
2. The ISO standardization process, which is decentralized, involves some
2,850 technical committees and 30,000 experts. It relies on market
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forces and is based on consensus. ”ISO” is not an acronym, but rather
a word formed from the Greek-based prefix ”iso-”, meaning ”equal”.
This has the convenient side-effect of allowing the organization to be
called the same thing in all languages. (www.iso.ch (1999)).
3. Initiated by the Farrell-Saloner (1985) and Katz-Shapiro (1985) pa-
pers, the ’network externalities’ literature deals with standardization
issues from the standpoint of the Nash equilibrium concept. For an
appraisal of this literature see the symposium ’Network Externalities’
in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1994), volume 8.
4. The founding papers of this promising literature include, among others,
Foster and Young (1990), Ellison (1993), Fudenberg and Kreps (1993),
Kandori, and Mailath and Rob (1993). For an up-to-date survey of the
literature (and nice developments as well), see the book by Fudenberg
and Levine (1998): Theory of Learning in Games.
5. Price can be either fixed or changing over time, as long as the net
utility function satisfies assumption A1. This covers not only non-
proprietary standards (e.g., type-writer keyboard arrangements, screw
threads, bank card formats, paper sizes, rail track gauges, computer
file compatibility formats such as ASCII), but also many proprietary
standards. Indeed, most standardization games do not allow for mul-
tiple winners so that price competition is fierce (i.e., is of the Bertrand
type). For instance, in the VHS/Beta battle over videotape format,
Liebowitz-Margolis (1995) show that both technologies were always re-
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tailed at about the same price, so that price cannot be said to have
played a discriminating role in consumers’ decisions.
6. This paper also considers heterogeneous agents (i.e., not everyone has
the same δ), whereas Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) consider ho-
mogeneous agents. That is, in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), the
payoff of adopting strategy k = A,B is for all agents αk + βkx
t
k with
βk > 0. Moreover, our paper concerns network externalities among
all agents, whereas interaction in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) is
strictly bilateral.
7. Following the work by Ainslie (1975), psychologists have emphasized
‘the decline in effectiveness of rewards, as the rewards are delayed from
the time of choice’, thus challenging the assumption of an exponen-
tial discount function. Parametric studies and experiments have even
found hyperbolic discount functions for humans and some animals. In
fact, consumers are not permanent and know this, so they optimize in
the short run. For a review of the literature, see Ainslie (1992) and
Loewenstein-Prelec (1992). Interesting discussion of the assumption of
myopic behavior can be found in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and
Fudenberg-Levine (1998), Chapter 4.
8. This is in contrast to the dampening of the mutation rate in Kan-
dori, Mailath and Rob (1993). They considers a stationary and ergodic
model, in which the population is of fixed size and each agent occa-
sionally mutates. That is, randomness about the fraction of agents
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who adopt each technology is added to the system by mutation. Hence
xtk does not converge. However, by letting the mutation rate tend to
zero as a comparative statics exercise and characterizing the limit of
the ergodic distribution, selection of a particular technology is ensured.
9. Figure 6a shows the stochastic market share evolution of standard A
for an initial number of adopters N0A = 1 and N
0
B = 20 and utility
functions uA(x) = (1 + x)
1.5 − 1 and uB(y) = y2. The final number of
adoptions is 150,021. The time scale is ln(t+21) where t is the number
of adoptions.
10. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this fact.
For more on replicator dynamics, see Weibull (1995) and Fudenberg-
Levine (1998).
11. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this discussion
on stability.
12. Indeed, according to assertion (ii) of theorem 1, this event has a positive
probability of occurrence.
13. Standardization occurs on A if a > b, and on B if a < b.
14. When a = b, depending on ’historical events’ any market share alloca-
tion may end up as the equilibrium. This degenerated case is ruled out
by assumption A3. In the linear case, we consider either a > b (AN2)
or a < b (AN2).
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15. Since the utility functions are rising and convex, AN2 (resp. AN3)
implies that the line connecting (0, 0) to (1, u′A(0)) (resp. (0, 0) to
(1, u′B(0))) is always below the curve uA(x) (resp. uB(x)), see Figure 1.
Moreover, since uB(1) ≥ uB(x) ∀x ∈ [0, 1], AN2 (resp. AN3) implies
that uA(x) > uB(x) ∀x ∈]0, 1] (resp. uB(x) > uA(x)).
16. τt = 1 +
1
2
+ . . .+ 1
t
is converging to ln(t).
17. The European Committee for Standardization (ECS) publishes Euro-
pean Standards, which are adopted after a vote where 71% or more
of the expressed votes are in favor. In contrast to other institutions,
in particular the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
countries voting against are still obliged to implement European Stan-
dards by giving them the status of national standard (for more on ISO,
and for links to ECS and other standardization organizations, see the
ISO home-page: www.iso.ch).
18. It might be the case that uA(1) = uB(1). The optimum is then stan-
dardization on either A or B.
19. Condition T4 requires that the second derivatives (left term) are not
too big compared to the first derivatives (right term). The linear case,
which is both convex and concave, is an extreme example of weak
concavity which fits with condition T4. An example of strictly concave
functions satisfying assumptions A1 and T4 is: uA(x) = 20x− x2 and
uB(y) = 0.5(20y − y2).
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20. The concavity of the utility functions implies that the slope of uk(x)
is always smaller than the slope of the line connecting (0, uk(0)) to
(x, uk(x)), that is u
′
k(x) ≤ uk(x)x ∀x ∈]0, 1] (k = A,B). This im-
plies u′A(1) ≤ uA(1) and u′B(1) ≤ uB(1) such that u′A(1) > u′B(0)
⇒ uA(1) > u′B(0) and u′B(1) > u′A(0) ⇒ uB(1) > u′A(0). Condition
T2+ (respectively T3+) is stronger than condition T2 (respectively
T3). They are equivalent in the linear case.
21. For instance, if the utility functions increase to a certain market share
ceiling and then stagnate, even with one standard inferior to the other
(e.g. under T2 but not u′A(1) > u
′
B(0)), standardization is sub-optimal.
22. A study in Nigeria concluded that up to 60% of medicines on the street
market were counterfeit.
54
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
